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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts
in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is
evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reects
the agents individual contribution to rm value. Both agents exhibit
disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we
nd that inequity aversion may be benecial: In the presence of envy,
for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more
protable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria
exist only with inequity averse agents.
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"Implicit contracts can be e¤ective only in a social atmosphere
that incorporates a sense of mutual respect and a consensus on
principles of fair play and good faith."
Arthur m. Okun1
1 Introduction
The present paper investigates how concerns for fairness among agents af-
fect the optimal provision of incentives in a one-task framework with only
subjective performance measures. In particular, we analyze the impact of
horizontal inequity aversion on the principals credibility in a relational con-
tract. We nd that there are cases where the principal prefers to employ
inequity averse rather than inequity neutral agents.
Frequently, if not typically, the agents true contribution to rm value
cannot be objectively assessed. In this case, the use of contractible but im-
perfect performance measures creates distortions with respect to the agents
e¤ort decision.2 In many cases, the agents true contribution to rm value
can, nonetheless, be observed by both contracting parties. The observed
subjective performance may be used in implicit agreements (relational con-
tracts). As subjective assessments are not veriable by third parties, con-
tracts are not court-enforceable and, thus, have to be self-enforcing. They
may be implemented in long-term relationships as reputational equilibria.3
Furthermore, agents contributions are not necessarily perfectly corre-
lated to their e¤orts. Thus, agents undertaking the same e¤ort could receive
di¤erent rewards. This might provoke envy, empathy or spiteful behavior
1Okun (1980), p. 8.
2There is a vast literature on pay for performance. See e.g. Kerr (1975), Baker (1992),
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and Holmström and Milgrom (1994). For congruency prob-
lems see e.g. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (2002).
3Reputational equilibria may exist if one party cares about her reputation in future
relationships. See e.g. Holmström (1981), Bull (1987), and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(1994).
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among agents, especially if they work on similar tasks.4 Taking into account
the presence of inequity averse preferences, we investigate the feasibility of
relational contracts.
We consider a relationship between one principal and two risk-neutral,
not nancially constrained agents who exhibit disadvantageous inequity
aversion. We have in mind employees working on similar tasks in small
or medium-size rms. Since workers tend to compare their payo¤s with
those of their colleagues, we believe the assumption of inequity aversion to
be reasonable. Specically, we model preferences as "self-centered inequity
aversion", as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), abstracting from em-
pathy.5 Neither agents e¤ort is directly observable by the principal, albeit
imperfectly correlated with individual performance. The principal seeks to
mitigate the resulting moral hazard problem by o¤ering each agent an in-
centive contract contingent on their respective performances.6 As observed
performance is not veriable, the contract has to be self-enforcing. In mod-
eling the game structure, we follow Bull (1987).
We replicate some results established in the literature. Grund and Sliwka
(2005) and Demougin and Fluet (2006) show that more envious agents exert
more e¤ort than less envious ones, when being o¤ered identical incentive
contracts. However, to ensure participation, the principal has to pay the
inequity averse agents a premium to compensate them for the faced risk of
unequal payo¤s (inequity premium). In this kind of framework, agency costs
increase in the presence of inequity aversion, as reported by e.g. Bartling
and Siemens (2005) and Grund and Sliwka (2005).7 Hence, the principal
would rather employ inequity neutral than inequity averse agents.
4See for experimental evidence of other-regarding preferences e.g. Goranson and
Berkowitz (1966), Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl
(1995), and Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). For the importance of reference groups,
see Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), and Bartling and Siemens (2006).
5For alternative approaches regarding the formalization of fairness concerns see e.g.
Rabin (1993), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
6We consider agents tasks to be independent such that there is no inherent advan-
tage in team production. Therefore we focus on individual bonus payments as a natural
compensation scheme.
7This holds under unlimited liability what is the case we consider. Under limited
liability, this might not be true; e¢ ciency may increase under inequity aversion as long
as agents receive rents. See e.g. Demougin and Fluet (2003) and Demougin and Fluet
(2006).
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The present paper analyzes how this conclusion is a¤ected under a re-
lational contract. The principals credibility constraint requires that her
gains from reneging fall short of the discounted gains from continuing the
relational contract.8 We nd that this constraint is ambiguously a¤ected
by the presence of envy: On the one hand, the incentive for the principal
to deviate from the relational contract in order to save bonus expenses de-
creases in the propensity for inequity aversion. Intuitively, this is due to the
fact that envious agents work harder given the same incentive in order to
avoid ending up with a lower payo¤ than their colleagues. This facilitates
credible commitment on the principals side. On the other hand, as agents
have to be compensated for their disutility incurred by envy, the principals
long-run prots out of the contract decrease as agents become more envious.
Consequently, commitment to paying the o¤ered bonus is more di¢ cult.
The sum of these two counteracting e¤ects determines whether credibil-
ity is either more or less easily obtained by the principal as agents become
more envious. Whenever the savings due to lower bonus payments exceed
the loss of prots via the inequity premium payments, the principal prefers
to employ more envious agents.
We identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which, for a certain
range of the principals discount rate, relational contracts are less protable
or even infeasible when agents do not exhibit inequity aversion. In that
case, inequity aversion becomes an advantageous factor in principal-agent
relationships in the sense that more reputational equilibria can be sustained
with envious agents.
Before proceeding with the analysis a few caveat are in order. First, we
limit attention to individual bonus schemes. Other contracts would be pos-
sible. For example, to align incentives the principal could use tournaments.
Here, the principal would not face any credibility problem. However, this
reward scheme would exacerbate problems related to inequity aversion. The
principal could also use a team bonus structure solely for the purpose of
avoiding inequity. This would introduce an alternative trade-o¤. Speci-
cally, a team bonus implies a weaker relationship between individual e¤ort
8We derive this rationality (credibility) constraint analogously to Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (1994).
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and the marginal likelihood of obtaining the bonus. This requires raising
the bonus level, making the relational contract less likely.
Second, one has to be aware of the fact that for an individuals perception
of fairness and equity many determinants beside the colleagues payo¤ may
play a role; e.g. e¤ort, ability, education, gender, status etc. Cognition
of inequity is presumably a¤ected by mutual comparisons regarding all the
mentioned characteristics. In our model, due to the agentshomogeneity
in both preferences and characteristics, di¤erences in payo¤s are the sole
source of inequity. Hence, payo¤ inequality accords with inequity.
The next section describes our basic framework. Subsection 2.1 addresses
the agency problem in the single-period game. Subsection 2.2 develops the
reputation game and thereby the relational contract. In section 3, we ex-
amine the impact of the agents propensity for envy on the feasibility of
the relational contract and derive our main result concerning the principals
credibility problem. Section 4 discusses the implications and concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a repeated game between a principal (the rm) and two agents
homogeneous in preferences and characteristics. In each period, each agent
chooses an unobservable e¤ort level ei that stochastically determines the
agents contribution to rm value Yi. That contribution is either high or
low; for simplicity Yi 2 f0; 1g. It is observable by all three contracting
parties, but not veriable, and can therefore only be used as a performance
measure in a self-enforcing relational contract.
By exerting e¤ort agent i (i = 1; 2) a¤ects the probability of Yi = 1:
Pr[Yi = 1jei] = p(ei); (1)
where p (ei) 2 [0; 1); p (0) = 0; p0 (ei) > 0; and p00 (ei) < 0. Agentsoutputs
are independent.
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The principal o¤ers each agent an explicit compensation contract speci-
fying a guaranteed xed wage w: In addition, the principal announces to pay
each agent a bonus b according to his respective contribution to rm value.
As the principals prot is assumed to be additive in the considered task,
the principal prefers employing more agents over less. However, taking into
account that there are other tasks that are not explicitely captured by the
contract investigated, overall she employs just two agents.9 The principal
o¤ers identical compensation contracts.
Provided that the principal keeps her promise, the bonus is paid when-
ever she observes Yi = 1. Thus, the agents net monetary payo¤ i   c (ei)
is:
i   c(ei) = w + bYi   c (ei) ; (2)
where c (ei) denotes each agents costs of e¤ort with c (0) = 0; c0 (0) = 0;
c0 (ei) > 0; and c00 (ei)  0:
Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), both agents exhibit inequity aver-
sion. In particular, we assume them only to su¤er from disadvantageous
inequity, i.e. they dislike outcomes where they are worse o¤ than the re-
spective other agent. Each agent observes the other agents gross monetary
payo¤. All parties are risk neutral and not nancially constrained. For
simplicity, the agentsutilities are assumed to be linear in money.
Agent is utility is given by
Ui (i; j) = i   c(ei)  maxfj   i; 0g;  > 0 (3)
where  denotes his propensity for envy. The third term thus captures the
disutility derived from being worse o¤ than agent j.10
9Alternatively, we could assume the principal to employ many agents and approach
the problem from the perspective of one agent, whereas all the others form his reference
group.
10Abstracting from costs, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose the following utility func-
tion: Ui = i   maxfj   i; 0g   maxfi   j ; 0g: Incorporating empathy via the
parameter  would not signicantly a¤ect our results, as it is established to assume  > .
Moreover, Demougin and Fluet (2006) take costs into account when investigating inequity:
Ui = i   c (ei)  maxfj   c (ej)  i + c (ei) ; 0g. This would not change our results.
However, an inconvenient discontinuity at the symmetric Nash-equilibrium would be in-
troduced.
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The timing of events within each period is as follows. At the beginning of
the period, the principal o¤ers each agent the above specied compensation
contract. Second, the agents either accept the contract or reject it in favor
of an alternative employment opportunity that provides utility U0. Third,
if the agents accept the contract, agents choose simultaneously respective
e¤ort levels ei. Fourth, Yi is realized and observed by all parties. Finally,
the agents receive the explicit xed wage, and if Yi = 1 the principal decides
whether to pay the implicit bonus or not.
2.1 The Single-Period Game
To derive the relational contract, we initially consider the single-period game
where we assume performance to be objectively assessable, i.e. there is no
credibility problem on the principals side.
Agent i su¤ers from disadvantageous inequity amounting to the di¤er-
ence in payo¤s;whenever agent j receives the bonus, but agent i does not.
Thus, given that agent j exerts e¤ort ej agent is expected utility is
E[Uijei; ej ] = w+p (ei) b c (ei) (1 p (ei))p (ej) b; i = 1; 2 ^ i 6= j (4)
We focus on the symmetric Nash-equilibrium, where agents exert identical
e¤ort levels; ei = ej = e: The equilibrium is characterized by
e = argmaxbe E[Uijbe; e]: (5)
The rst-order condition yields
bp0 (e)  c0 (e) + p0 (e) p (e) b = 0: (IC)
Thus, given that the agents exhibit inequity aversion and are faced with a
contract with bonus b, they will undertake e¤ort e, implicitely dened by
c0 (e)
(1 + p (e)) p0 (e)
: (6)
To put it di¤erently, when agents are characterized by inequity aversion
 and the principal wants to induce e¤ort e, she has to o¤er a bonus
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b (e;) dened by (6). Holding e constant and implicitely di¤erentiating
(6) with respect to  yields the e¤ect of a variation of the degree of inequity
aversion on the workerswillingness to undertake e¤ort for a given bonus
level.
Proposition 1 With an increasing propensity for envy, the agents exert
more e¤ort for any given bonus.
Proof. @b(e;)@ =   p(e)p0(e) c
0(e)
(p(e)+1)2
< 0
Intuitively, as envious agents su¤er from being worse o¤ than their
co-workers to a larger extent than standard agents, they exert relatively
higher levels of e¤ort in order to decrease the probability of not getting
the bonus. This incentive-strengthening e¤ect is in line with Demougin and
Fluet (2006).11 In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to it as the bonus
e¤ect.
The principals prot per agent i is V (ei;) = (1  b (ei;))Yi   w:
Hence, she solves
max
e
(1  b (e;)) p(e)  w (7)
s:t: E[Uije; e]  U0; (PC)
bp0 (e)  c0 (e) + p0 (e) p (e) b = 0; (IC)
where (PC) ensures participation. Since we assume unlimited liability, the
participation constraint binds, leading to zero rent for the agents in the
optimal contract. In equilibrium, for each agent holds
w + p (e) b = c (e) + (1  p (e))p (e) b+ U0: (8)
The second term on the right-hand side in equation (8) is the inequity pre-
mium. Hence, expected wage costs per agent are equal to the sum of his
costs of e¤ort, his reservation utility, and the inequity premium.
11 In the context of tournaments, Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Demougin and Fluet
(2003) report the same result.
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Substituting w and b in the principals objective function by using (8)
and (6), her problem simplies to
max
e
p(e)  c (e)  p(e) (1  p(e)) c
0 (e)
(1 + p (e)) p0 (e)
  U0: (9)
Let the e¤ort level that maximizes the principals prot (9) be denoted e.
In the subsequent sections, e will serve as a benchmark.
Proposition 2 For any given e; with veriable performance, total agency
costs increase in the propensity for envy, .
Proof. The derivative of (9) w.r.t.  is negative, as   c0(e)p0(e) p(e)(1 p(e))(p(e)+1)2 < 0:
Despite the bonus e¤ect the principal faces higher costs when agents
are inequity averse. This result is due to the fact that the principal needs
to compensate the agent for his expected disutility from inequity in order
to ensure participation. We refer to this wage cost-augmenting e¤ect as
inequity premium e¤ect. This result is in line with the agency literature, see
e.g. Bartling and Siemens (2005) and Grund and Sliwka (2005).
2.2 The Repeated Game
To model the relational contract, we embed the foregoing stage game into an
innitely repeated game, considering trigger strategy equilibria. Following
Bull (1987), we assume that each agent has a nite working life, whereas the
rm is assumed to be innitely-long lived. If the principal reneges on the
promised bonus once, no agent will ever again believe the rm to fulll the
contract, as the information on the principals deviation from the relational
contract is rapidly transmitted to the labor market.
As e¤ort is not contractible, agents will exert zero e¤ort if relational
contracts are infeasible, corresponding to a closure of the rm and resulting
in a fallback prot of zero: V F = 0. If relational contracts are feasible,
the principal realizes a continuation prot from the long-term relationship,
denoted V C (e;) ; corresponding to expected prot dened in (9).
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For the relational contract to be self-enforcing, the gains from reneging
must fall short of the gains from continuing the relational contract. This is
required to hold for all realizations of performance. If both agents perform
successfully, Yi = Yj = 1, the principals incentive to renege on the rela-
tional contract is strongest, as her resulting one-time benet from deviation
amounts to twice the bonus. Concerning her reputation, it does not make
any di¤erence whether she refuses to pay just one or both bonuses. Thus,
b (e;)  V
C (e;)
r
(RC)
constitutes the reneging constraint of the principal (RC). Whether condition
(RC) can be satised or not, depends on the rms interest rate r.
3 The Optimal Relational Contract
In the following, we investigate whether an increase in the propensity for
envy facilitates the feasibility of relational contracts, i.e. whether the prin-
cipal may commit herself for higher levels of r, provided that agents are
envious, compared to the case of non-envious agents.
The di¤erent e¤ects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts can
be understood by closer examination of condition (RC). The impact of  is
twofold. On the one hand, as shown in Proposition 1, we observe the bonus
e¤ect ; @b@ < 0. Consequently, the incentive of a one-time-deviation from
the relational contract in order to save bonus expenses decreases. On the
other hand, the inequity premium e¤ect lowers the principals prot from
contract continuation; @V
C
@ < 0, as shown in Proposition 2. Thus, fullling
the relational contract is less attractive to the principal.
Hence, depending on the overall e¤ect of  on (RC) commitment power
of the principal may either become stronger or weaker as agents become more
envious. In the former case, more reputational equilibria can be sustained
with envious agents. In the following, we analyze condition (RC) and the
relative impact of the described e¤ects in greater detail.
To illustrate the issue we use an example represented in Figure 1. Specif-
ically, we assume  = 0:2; p (e) = 1   exp ( e), c (e) = 18e2; and U0 = 0:1.
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The gure plots the principals expected prot V C (e;). The convex curves
depict rb (e;) for various discount rates.
Figure 1: Reneging Constraint for p (e) = 1 exp ( e) ;  = 0:2, c (e) = 18e2;
and U0 = 0:1.
For a su¢ ciently low interest rate the (RC) does not bind. The principal
implements the prot-maximizing benchmark e¤ort level e (equivalent to
the case of veriable performance). We denote the threshold interest rate
where the (RC) just becomes binding for any higher interest rate rl. The
dashed line illustrates rlb (e;).
The solid curve depicts rb (e;) for a medium interest rate where the
(RC) binds. To ensure credibility on the one hand and to maximize prof-
its on the other hand, the principal will always choose to implement the
maximum e¤ort that just satises the (RC), i.e. the e¤ort where V C (e;)
and rb (e;) intersect at the highest possible e. The gure illustrates that
the optimal e¤ort declines as the principals discount rate or the agents
alternative utilities increase.12
12This result has also been shown by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994).
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For a su¢ ciently high interest rate condition (RC) cannot be satised.
The interest rate rh where the (RC) can just be fullled via adjustment
of e; is characterized by rhb (e;) being tangent to V C (e;). The e¤ort
level implemented at this threshold is denoted eh. Relational contracts are
infeasible for any interest rate higher than the threshold interest rate rh.
The dotted line, rhb (e;), represents this marginal case.
rh and eh are implicitely dened as the solution of the following 2 
2  system consisting of the binding reneging constraint and the tangency
condition:
r = V
C(e;)
b(e;)
r @b(e;)@e =
@V C(e;)
@e
(10)
The higher the marginal interest rate rh is, the greater is the range of
interest rates the principal may credibly commit for. The value of rh is
determined by the agentspropensity for envy. By investigating the impact
of  on rh we derive the following result.
Proposition 3 An increasing propensity for envy enhances the feasibility
of the relational contract, i¤ the following condition holds:
p

eh

>
 
c
 
eh

+ U0

p0
 
eh

+ c0
 
eh

p0 (eh) + c0 (eh)
(11)
Proof. See Appendix.
The necessary and su¢ cient condition (11) assures that the bonus e¤ect
outweighs the inequity premium e¤ect. The principals incentive to renege
on the bonus payments is su¢ ciently low such that the negative impact of
envy on the continuation prot is overcompensated. Whether condition (11)
holds, depends on the particular way the performance measure is a¤ected
by e¤ort in relation to the costs of e¤ort and the alternative utility. The
condition can only be fullled, if the sum of e¤ort costs and alternative utility
is smaller than unity. Further, if the marginal probability of generating
a favorable outcome is high relative to the marginal costs of e¤ort, the
condition is more easily fullled.
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Thus, we nd that in the reputation game a high propensity for envy may
be advantageous for the principal regarding her commitment power. There
exist cases, where the principal can build up a long-term contractual rela-
tionship with inequity averse agents, whereas with inequity neutral agents
she cannot. Hence, under the above condition (11) reputational equilibria
can be sustained for a greater range of interest rates with inequity averse
agents.
Figure 2 illustrates our result for the example functions introduced on
page 11. It plots the principals prot under the optimal contract for any
level of r; V  (r; ) = maxV C (e;) ; s.t. b  V C=r: The solid curve depicts
her prot under the relational contract, if  takes a high value ( = 0:8) : The
dashed curve depicts her prot, if agents do not exhibit any propensity for
envy ( = 0). The example function satises condition (11), i.e. rh (0:8) >
rh (0).
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
1.0 1.50.5
Figure 2: Prots with inequity neutral and inequity averse agents for p (e) =
1  exp ( e) ; c (e) = 18e2; and U0 = 0:1:
For any functions satisfying condition (11), the following considerations
hold. For su¢ ciently low interest rates r, i.e. interest rates below the re-
spective lower interest thresholds, r  rl (), a relational contract is feasible
and the optimal e¤ort level e can be induced by the principal. V  (e;) is
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realized.
For any interest rate r inbetween the respective lower and upper thresh-
old levels, i.e. rl () < r  rh (), e¤ort e has to be adapted such that
(RC) is fullled. Prots, V  (e;), decrease in this range as interest rates
increase. However, depending on the value of , prots decrease at di¤erent
rates.
When r takes a value higher than the critical value br; continuation prof-
its from employing envious agents exceed those from employing non-envious
ones. Even more importantly, there exist some r inbetween the upper thresh-
olds, i.e. rh (low) < r  rh (high), for which relational contracts are feasi-
ble with more inequity averse agents, whereas the principal cannot credibly
commit herself when dealing with less inequity averse agents. Reputational
equilibria can be sustained for a greater range of interest rates in the pres-
ence of inequity aversion on the agentssides.
4 Concluding Remarks
We consider optimal individual incentive schemes in a principal-agent rela-
tionship with two identical agents who exhibit horizontal disadvantageous
inequity aversion. As there are only subjective performance measures avail-
able to evaluate the agentsperformances, the bonus contracts are enforced
in a reputational equilibrium.
The analysis focuses on the impact of the agentspropensity for envy
on the principals commitment power that determines the feasibility of the
relational contract. There are two countervailing e¤ects at work: As agency
costs increase due to inequity aversion, the principals prots from the con-
tract decrease as agents become more envious. Thus, continuation of the
relational contract becomes less attractive. On the other hand, inequity
aversion serves as an incentive-strengthening device. This implies that the
principal has to pay a lower bonus to implement the same e¤ort given that
agents are envious, thereby reducing her benet from a one-time deviation.
We identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition assuring that the principals
ability to commit increases as agents become more envious.
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This result has several implications. The implementation of a relational
contract might not be possible with inequity neutral agents, when the re-
turn on the principals alternative investment possibilities is relatively high.
Thus, this could lead her to displace production to countries, where peo-
ple generally exhibit a greater degree of inequity aversion due to cultural
di¤erences.13
Further, one could expect a more frequent implementation of relational
contracts in countries whose populations are more sensitive to inequity aver-
sion. This hypothesis is in line with the ndings of Moriguchi (2003), who
explains di¤erences in institutional arrangements in the U.S. and Japan,
pointing out that the U.S. was hit harder by the Great Depression com-
pared to Japan. This goes along with lower continuation prots and, thus
results in the less frequent use of relational contracts in the U.S. According
to our analysis, a depreciation of future prots has a less severe impact on
the feasibility of relational contracts if employees are inequity averse. Hence,
these countriesdi¤erences in the propensity for inequity aversion could also
play a role for the explanation of di¤erences in institutional arrangements
in this context.14
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Di¤erentiation of rh yields
@rh
@
=

@V C
@e

e=eh
b  V C @b@e

e=eh

@e
@ +
@V C
@

e=eh
b  V C @b@

e=eh
b2
: (12)
The system (10) implies
@V C
@e

e=eh
b

eh;

  V C(eh;) @b
@e

e=eh
= 0: (13)
With (13), (12) simplies to
13Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) and Corneo (2001) nd Europeans to exhibit
a higher propensity for inequity aversion in comparison to U.S. Americans.
14Empirical evidence suggests that the Japanese exhibit stronger inequity aversion than
e.g. U.S. Americans.
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@rh
@
=
@V C
@

e=eh
b  V C @b@

e=eh
b2
: (14)
To decide upon the e¤ect of  on rh the sign of equation (14) is crucial:
sign

@rh
@

= sign

@V C
@

e=eh
b  V C @b
@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(15)
Substituting V C as given in (9) and with
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 
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equation (15) further simplies to
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(16)
With b
 
eh;

=
c0(eh)
(1+p(eh))p0(eh)
as given in (6) and
@b
 
eh;

@
=   c
0  eh p  eh p0  eh
((1 + p (eh)) p0 (eh))2
equation (16) results in
sign

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= sign
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
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
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
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
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:
(17)
Thus,
@rh
@ > 0 i¤ p
 
eh

>
(c(eh)+U0)p0(eh)+c0(eh)
p0(eh)+c0(eh)
:
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